A logic of universal causation  by Turner, Hudson
Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 87–123
A logic of universal causation
Hudson Turner 1
Department of Computer Science, University of Minnesota at Duluth, Duluth, MN 55812, USA
Received 13 August 1997; received in revised form 13 August 1999
Abstract
For many commonsense reasoning tasks associated with action domains, only a relatively simple
kind of causal knowledge is required—knowledge of the conditions under which facts are caused.
This note introduces a modal nonmonotonic logic for representing causal knowledge of this kind,
relates it to other nonmonotonic formalisms, and shows that a variety of causal theories of action
can be expressed in it, including the recently proposed causal action theories of Lin. The new logic
extends the causal theories formalism of McCain and Turner, and provides a more adequate semantic
account of it. A useful subset of the logic has a concise translation into classical propositional logic,
and so can be used for automated planning and reasoning about action. A larger subset is closely
related to logic programming under the answer set semantics, yielding another approach to automated
reasoning. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This note introduces a modal nonmonotonic logic of “universal causation”, called
UCL, designed for formalizing commonsense knowledge about actions. UCL extends the
recently introduced causal theories formalism of McCain and Turner [39], which shares its
underlying motivations. The fundamental distinction in UCL—between propositions that
have a cause and propositions that (merely) obtain—is expressed by means of the modal
operator C, read as “caused”. For example, one can write
φ ⊃ Cψ
to say that ψ is caused whenever φ obtains. These simple linguistic resources make it
possible for a UCL theory to express the conditions under which facts are caused. It is in
this sense that UCL is a logic of causation.
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As usual for nonmonotonic logics, the main semantic definition in UCL—of a “causally
explained” interpretation—is given by a fixpoint condition. Intuitively, an interpretation
is causally explained by a UCL theory T if it represents the facts true in a world that
is “causally possible” according to T . The focus in UCL on causally possible worlds is
motivated by the following pair of observations.
– Knowledge of the causally possible worlds is sufficient for many commonsense
reasoning tasks associated with action domains, such as prediction and planning.
– In order to determine the causally possible worlds, it is sufficient to know the
conditions under which facts are caused.
The first observation suggests that UCL can be useful. The second observation helps
explain why UCL can be simple: it formalizes causal knowledge of a relatively simple
kind, and does not attempt the notoriously difficult task of formalizing causal relations of
the form “φ causes ψ”. Happily, one can describe and reason about the conditions under
which facts are caused without settling the question of what causes what.
In UCL, the notion of a causally possible world is made precise on the basis of the
following pair of assumptions.
– In a causally possible world, every fact that is caused obtains.
– In a causally possible world, every fact that obtains is caused.
The first assumption is unremarkable. The second is not. As in [39], we call it the principle
of universal causation. This simplifying assumption is the key to the main semantic
definition of the logic, which is therefore named for it. We take these two assumptions
together to define what it is for a world to be causally possible: what obtains in the world
is exactly what is caused in it. Accordingly, the main semantic definition in UCL says that
an interpretation I is causally explained by a UCL theory T if what is true in I is exactly
what is caused in I according to T .
The principle of universal causation is easily relaxed in practice. For instance, when
describing action domains, we generally have little or nothing to say about the “actual”
conditions under which facts in the initial situation are caused. Instead, our UCL action
theories typically stipulate that facts in the initial situation are caused. Such stipulations
are straightforward in UCL, where one can say that φ is caused whenever it is true simply
by writing
φ ⊃ Cφ.
In the same way, we typically stipulate that facts about the occurrence and nonoccurrence
of actions are caused.
More interesting are those facts that, roughly speaking, are true simply because they
were true before and haven’t been made false since. It is facts of this kind that give
rise to the frame problem [42]. Solutions to the frame problem typically appeal to the
“commonsense law of inertia”, according to which the value of an inertial fluent persists
unless it is caused to change. The principle of universal causation makes possible a simple,
robust encoding of the commonsense law of inertia. Take ft to stand for the proposition
that a fluent f holds at a time t . One can write
ft ∧ ft+1 ⊃ Cft+1 (1)
to stipulate that f is caused at time t + 1 whenever it persists from time t to time t + 1.
Thus, axioms of form (1) can, in effect, suspend the principle of universal causation with
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respect to persistent inertial fluents. Of course, universal causation still requires that if f
does not persist, the new value of f must be caused. That is, the UCL theory must describe
conditions sufficient for it to be caused. In this way, inertia axioms of form (1) interact with
the principle of universal causation to solve the frame problem, guaranteeing that inertial
fluents persist unless they are caused to change.
Typical features of action domain descriptions are easily expressed in UCL. Here are a
few examples based on the infamous Yale Shooting domain [23] (as extended by Baker
[1]). One can write
Shoott ⊃ C¬Alivet+1∧C¬Loadedt+1 (2)
to describe the direct effects of shooting: whenever Shoot occurs, both ¬Alive and
¬Loaded are caused to hold subsequently. One can write
Shoott ⊃ Loadedt
to express a precondition of the shoot action: shoot can occur only when the gun is loaded.
To say that Fred is caused to be not walking whenever he is caused to be not alive, one can
write, for instance,
C¬Alivet ⊃ C¬Walkingt . (3)
From (2) and (3) it follows that whenever Shoot occurs, ¬Walking is caused to hold
subsequently. Traditionally,¬Walking is referred to as an “indirect effect” or “ramification”
of the action Shoot.
In accordance with common sense, (3) does not imply C Walkingt ⊃ C Alivet . Intuitively,
you cannot bring Fred back to life by getting him to walk. Instead, he simply can’t walk
unless he’s alive. That is, in any causally possible world, Fred is alive if he is walking.
Accordingly, if (3) is an axiom of a UCL theory T , then Walkingt ⊃ Alivet is true in every
interpretation causally explained by T .
UCL differs in fundamental ways from nonmonotonic formalisms such as default logic
[47] and autoepistemic logic [43]. First, UCL is not motivated by the problem of general
default reasoning and knowledge representation. It is designed for a more specific purpose.
Second, in UCL one describes the conditions under which facts are caused, rather than
the conditions under which facts are believed or known. Third, the fixpoint condition in
UCL characterizes complete worlds, in the form of classical interpretations, rather than
incomplete, logically closed belief sets. Nonetheless, we will see that UCL is closely
related to default logic, in the special case when we consider only the “complete”,
consistent extensions of default theories. We will also discuss a rather striking similarity
between the main semantic definitions of UCL and autoepistemic logic.
The syntax and some of the motivations of UCL are anticipated in a more ambitious
formalism introduced by Geffner [11–13]. Geffner employs a modal language with
a single modal operator C, read as “explained”, and defines “default theories which
explicitly accommodate a distinction between ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ propositions”
[12]. His proposal is meant to enhance “the appeal of preferential entailment as a
unifying framework for nonmonotonic inference” by contributing to the development of
“a general domain-independent criterion for inferring preferences from theories” [12]. The
mathematical complexity of Geffner’s definitions may reflect the generality of his goal.
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By comparison, in UCL both aim and means are modest. It appears that UCL can be
embedded in Geffner’s formalism, perhaps with some minor technical modifications, but
we do not pursue this possibility here. The rewards would be minimal, given the differences
in emphasis, and in mathematical machinery.
It appears that Geffner’s proposal was inspired by Judea Pearl’s investigation of
the distinction between causal and noncausal grounds in general default reasoning
and probabilistic reasoning, as developed in [45] and many subsequent publications.
Consideration of the relationship of UCL to this body of work is beyond the scope of
this note.
In recent years, many researchers have put forward proposals for causal theories
of action and change [2,4,5,10,12,16,18,19,21,22,30,33,38,39,48–52]. In this note we
consider the relationship of UCL to only a few of these proposals. As described previously,
UCL can be understood as an extension of the causal theories approach of [39], where
Norman McCain and the current author introduced so-called “causal laws” of the form
φ⇒ψ , with the intended reading “necessarily, if φ then the fact that ψ is caused”. Here
we show that such causal laws can be translated in UCL as φ ⊃ Cψ , thus providing a
more adequate semantic account of them. We go on to develop in some detail the close
relationship between such causal laws and the circumscriptive approach to “causal laws”
of Lin [33,34]. Along the same lines, we show that the “static causal laws” of [38,51]
correspond to UCL formulas of the form Cφ ⊃ Cψ .
A useful fragment of UCL has a concise translation into classical propositional logic, via
the “literal completion” method of [39], which is closely related to the well-known Clark
completion method for logic programs [8]. A larger fragment of UCL corresponds closely
to logic programming under the answer set semantics of Gelfond and Lifschitz [14]. These
translations allow automated reasoning with UCL, using publicly available, fast improving
satisfiability solvers and logic programming systems. Experimental results reported in [40]
demonstrate that such an approach can be used to solve (what are currently) hard classical
planning problems.
The contributions of this note can be summarized as follows. It introduces UCL, a
mathematically simple modal nonmonotonic logic designed for representing commonsense
knowledge about actions. By establishing relationships with previous proposals, it shows
how a variety of causal theories of action can be expressed in UCL. By relating these
proposals to a single logical framework, it contributes to the ongoing investigation of the
relationships between various approaches. Finally, it relates UCL to some well-known
nonmonotonic formalisms, and identifies methods for carrying out automated reasoning
on the basis of UCL theories.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 defines propositional UCL, the fragment primarily
investigated in this note. Section 3 presents preliminary examples. Section 4 shows that
UCL extends the causal theories formalism of [39], and Section 5 describes the general
method of formalizing action domains inherited from that paper. Section 6 relates UCL
to default logic and logic programming, and Section 7 considers some results thereby
inherited from [38,46,51]. Section 8 shows that a fragment of UCL can be nicely reduced
to circumscriptive theories, and Section 9 explores the relationship between UCL and the
circumscriptive action theories of Lin [33,34]. In Section 10, we consider the relationship
of UCL to autoepistemic logic. In Section 11, we extend UCL to allow quantifiers. In
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Section 12, we show that UCL extends the nonpropositional causal theories of Lifschitz
[30], which, in turn, extend the propositional causal theories discussed in Section 4.
Section 13 consists of concluding remarks.
2. Propositional UCL
Begin with a set of propositional symbols (atoms)—the signature of our language. For
convenience, we assume that the language includes zero-place logical connectives > and
⊥ such that > and ¬⊥ are tautological. A literal is an atom or its negation. We identify
each interpretation with the set of literals true in it. UCL formulas are defined as usual for a
modal propositional language with single unary modal operator C. A formula is nonmodal
if C does not occur in it. A UCL theory is a set of UCL formulas.
The main semantic definition (of a “causally explained” interpretation) is obtained by
imposing a fixpoint condition on S5 modal logic. Thus, a UCL structure is a pair (I, S)
such that I is an interpretation, and S is a set of interpretations to which I belongs. The
truth of a UCL sentence in a UCL structure is defined by the standard recursions over the
propositional connectives, plus the following two conditions.
(I, S) |= p iff I |= p (for any atom p)
(I, S) |= Cφ iff for all I ′ ∈ S, (I ′, S) |= φ.
Given a UCL theory T , we write (I, S) |= T to mean that (I, S) |= φ, for every φ ∈ T . In
this case, we say that (I, S) is a model of T . We also say that (I, S) is an I -model of T ,
emphasizing the distinguished interpretation I .
Main Definition. Let T be a UCL theory. An interpretation I is causally explained by T
if (I, {I }) is the unique I -model of T .
We distinguish three entailment relations. The first two—classical propositional entail-
ment and propositional S5 entailment—are standard, monotonic relations. The third—UCL
entailment—is defined as follows. For any UCL theory T and nonmodal formula φ, we
write T |≈φ to say that φ is true in every interpretation causally explained by T .
3. Examples
Let T1 be the UCL theory with one formula
p ⊃ Cp
in the language with a single atom p. Let I1 be the interpretation {p}. The structure
(I1, {I1}) is the unique I1-model of T1, so I1 is causally explained by T . The only other
interpretation is I2 = {¬p}. Since (I2, {I1, I2}) |= T1, I2 is not causally explained by T1.
Therefore, T1 |≈p.
Notice that it is essential that the language of T1 include only the atom p. If the language
of T1 were extended to include a second atom q , there would no longer be any causally
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explained interpretations, since, intuitively, T1 includes no formula expressing conditions
under which q is caused. Notice that we can obtain a conservative extension of T1 by
adding, for instance, the formula Cq ∨ C¬q . The resulting UCL theory has the same UCL-
consequences in the language of T1, since its causally explained interpretations are {p,q}
and {p,¬q}. In fact, it also has the same S5-consequences in the language of T1.
Let T2 be the UCL theory obtained by adding to T1 the formula
¬p ⊃ C¬p.
Both I1 and I2 are causally explained by T2. Therefore, T2 |6≈p, which illustrates the
nonmonotonicity of UCL.
Let T3 be the UCL theory obtained from T2 by adding the atom q to the language, and
also adding the formula
C(q ≡ p).
The interpretations {p,q} and {¬p,¬q} are both causally explained by T3. No others are.
This last example illustrates the following general phenomenon. We obtain a definitional
extension T ′ of a UCL theory T by adding a new atom p to the signature and also adding
an explicit definition of p—a formula of the form
C(p ≡ φ) (4)
where φ is a nonmodal formula in which p does not occur. It is not difficult to verify that
T ′ is a conservative extension of T . Moreover, one can replace any formula equivalent to
φ by p anywhere in T ′, except in (4), without affecting the models of T ′, or, therefore, the
causally explained interpretations.
4. Causal theories in UCL
In [39], Norman McCain and the current author defined the so-called causal theories
formalism, together with a general method of formalizing action domains as causal
theories. This section recalls the definition of a causal theory, and specifies a simple
translation from causal theories into UCL. It also describes the “literal completion” method
inherited by UCL from causal theories, which provides a concise translation of a fragment
of UCL into classical propositional logic.
4.1. McCain and Turner’s causal theories
A causal law is an expression of the form
φ⇒ψ (5)
where φ and ψ are (nonmodal) formulas. By a causal theory we mean a set of causal laws.
We emphasize that (5) is not the material conditional φ ⊃ ψ . In fact, we will show that
φ⇒ψ can be translated in UCL as
φ ⊃ Cψ. (6)
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As in UCL, the main definition in the language of causal theories is that of a causally
explained interpretation. Let D be a causal theory and I an interpretation. Define
DI = {ψ: for some φ, φ⇒ψ ∈D and I |= φ}.
We say that I is causally explained by D if I is the unique model of DI .
4.2. Embedding causal theories in UCL
Given a causal theory D, let ucl(D) denote the UCL theory obtained from D by
replacing each causal law (5) with the corresponding UCL formula (6).
Theorem 1. For any causal theory D, an interpretation I is causally explained by D if
and only if I is causally explained by ucl(D).
Lemma 2. For any causal theoryD and UCL structure (I, S), (I, S) |= ucl(D) if and only
if, for all I ′ ∈ S, I ′ |=DI .
Proof. The lemma follows easily from the following observation. For every φ⇒ψ ∈D,
the following two conditions are equivalent.
– (I, S) |= φ ⊃ Cψ .
– If I |= φ , then, for all I ′ ∈ S, I ′ |=ψ . 2
Proof of Theorem 1. (⇒) Assume that I is the unique model of DI . By Lemma 2,
(I, {I }) |= ucl(D). Let S be a superset of {I } such that (I, S) |= ucl(D). By Lemma 2, for
all I ′ ∈ S, I ′ |=DI . It follows that S = {I }, so (I, {I }) is the unique I -model of ucl(D).
(⇐) Assume that (I, {I }) is the unique I -model of ucl(D). By Lemma 2, I |=DI .
Assume that I ′ |=DI . By Lemma 2, (I, {I, I ′}) |= ucl(D). It follows that I = I ′, so I
is the unique model of DI . 2
4.3. UCL in classical propositional logic
Here we define the class of “definite” UCL theories, which inherit from (“definite”)
causal theories a concise translation into classical propositional logic, by the literal
completion method [39].
A UCL formula is definite if it is nonmodal or has the form
φ ⊃ CL (7)
where φ is nonmodal and L is a literal. A UCL theory T is definite if
– each of its formulas is definite, and
– for every literal L, T has finitely many formulas (7) with consequent CL.
Let T be a definite UCL theory. By the literal completion of T we mean the classical
propositional theory obtained by an elaboration of the Clark completion method [8], as
follows. For each literal L in the language of T , include the formula
L≡ (φ1 ∨ · · · ∨ φn) (8)
94 H. Turner / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 87–123
where φ1, . . . , φn are the antecedents of the formulas of form (7) in T with consequent CL.
(Of course, if no formula (7) in T has consequent CL, then formula (8) becomes L≡⊥.)
Include also all nonmodal formulas from T .
Theorem 3. An interpretation is causally explained by a definite UCL theory T if and only
if it is a model of the literal completion of T .
This result follows immediately, by Theorem 1, from Proposition 1 of [40]. In that
paper, classical propositional theories obtained by literal completion from causal theories
are used to solve hard classical planning problems from [27], demonstrating the potential
effectiveness of this approach to automated reasoning with UCL.
5. Causal theories of action in UCL
By Theorem 1, UCL inherits the general approach to action formalization from [39].
Here we review it, in the UCL setting.
5.1. L(F ,A,T ) languages
It is convenient to specify the underlying propositional signature by means of three
pairwise-disjoint sets: a nonempty set F of fluent names, a set A of action names, and a
nonempty set T of time names, corresponding to the natural numbers or an initial segment
of them. The atoms of the language L(F ,A,T ) are divided into two classes, defined
as follows. The fluent atoms are expressions of the form ft such that f ∈ F and t ∈ T .
Intuitively, ft is true if and only if the fluent f holds at time t . The action atoms are
expressions of the form at such that a ∈A and t + 1 ∈ T . Intuitively, at is true if and only
if the action a occurs at time t . A fluent literal is a fluent atom or its negation. A fluent
formula is a propositional combination of fluent atoms.
5.2. L(F ,A,T ) domain descriptions
We illustrate the approach by formalizing a slight elaboration of Lin’s Suitcase domain
[33] in which there is a suitcase with two latches, each of which may be in either of two
positions, up or down. The suitcase is spring-loaded so that whenever both latches are in
the up position the suitcase is caused to be open. We model the opening of the suitcase as
a static effect (as Lin does); that is, we do not model a state of the domain in which both
latches are up but the suitcase is not (yet) open.
We take time names corresponding to the natural numbers, and we choose fluent names
and action names as follows.
Fluents

Up(L1) : the first latch is up
Up(L2) : the second latch is up
IsOpen : the suitcase is open
H. Turner / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 87–123 95
Actions

Toggle(L1) : toggle the first latch
Toggle(L2) : toggle the second latch
Close : close the suitcase
Given our choice of language, the Suitcase domain can be partially formalized by the
following four schemas, where l is a metavariable ranging over {L1,L2}.
Toggle(l)t ∧Up(l)t ⊃ C¬Up(l)t+1 (9)
Toggle(l)t ∧¬Up(l)t ⊃ C Up(l)t+1 (10)
Closet ⊃ C¬ IsOpent+1 (11)
Up(L1)t ∧Up(L2)t ⊃ C IsOpent . (12)
According to schemas (9) and (10), whenever a latch is toggled at a time t it is caused to
be in the opposite state at time t +1. Schema (11) says that whenever the suitcase is closed
at a time t it is caused to be not open at t + 1. Schema (12) says that whenever both latches
are up at a time t the suitcase is caused to be open also at t . Schemas (9)–(11) express
“dynamic causal laws”. Schema (12) expresses a “static causal law”.
The UCL theory (9)–(12) is an incomplete description of the Suitcase domain because
it does not represent sufficient conditions for certain facts being caused: namely, facts
preserved by inertia, facts about the initial situation, and facts about which actions occur
(and when). The following schemas provide a standard way to complete the description.
In the following two schemas, a is a metavariable for action names.
at ⊃ Cat (13)
¬at ⊃ C¬at . (14)
Schema (13) says that the occurrence of an action a at a time t is caused whenever a
occurs at t . Schema (14) says that the nonoccurrence of an action a at a time t is caused
whenever a does not occur at t . In effect, by these schemas we represent that facts about
action occurrences are exogenous to the theory.
In the following two schemas, f is a metavariable for fluent names.
f0 ⊃ Cf0 (15)
¬f0 ⊃ C¬f0. (16)
In effect, by these schemas we represent that facts about the initial values of fluents may
be exogenous to the theory.
By a fluent designating formula we mean a propositional combination of fluent names.
Given a fluent designating formula σ and a time name t , we write σt to stand for the
fluent formula obtained from σ by simultaneously replacing each occurrence of each fluent
name f by the fluent atom ft .
Let I be a set of fluent designating formulas. We express that the fluents designated by
the formulas in I are inertial by writing the following schema, where σ is a metavariable
ranging over I .
σt ∧ σt+1 ⊃ Cσt+1. (17)
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According to schema (17), whenever a fluent designated in I holds at two successive times,
its truth at the second time is taken to be caused simply by virtue of its persistence. For the
Suitcase domain, we take I to be the set of all fluent names and their negations. 2
Schemas (9)–(17) express the complete UCL theory T4 for the Suitcase domain.
Schemas (9)–(12) are domain specific. We call the remaining schemas (13)–(17) standard
schemas. Intuitively, the standard schemas exempt specific classes of facts from the
principle of universal causation.
Let I be the interpretation characterized below.
• ¬Toggle(L1)0 • ¬Toggle(L1)1 • ¬Toggle(L1)2 · · ·
• Toggle(L2)0 • ¬Toggle(L2)1 • ¬Toggle(L2)2 · · ·
• ¬Close0 • ¬Close1 • ¬Close2 · · ·
• Up(L1)0 • Up(L1)1 • Up(L1)2 · · ·
• ¬Up(L2)0 • Up(L2)1 • Up(L2)2 · · ·
• ¬ IsOpen0 • IsOpen1 • IsOpen2 · · ·
Interpretation I specifies, for all actions a and times t , whether or not a occurs at t , and, for
all fluents f and times t , whether or not f holds at t . Here, exactly one action occurs—the
toggling of the second latch at time 0—and, intuitively, it results in the suitcase being open
at time 1. (The ellipses indicate that after time 2 no action occurs and no fluent changes its
value. The bullets indicate literals that are “explained” by the standard schemas.) It is not
difficult to see that I is causally explained by T4.
The following formula is a UCL-consequence of T4.
Up(L1)0 ∧Up(L2)0 ∧Close0 ⊃ Toggle(L1)0 ∨ Toggle(L2)0.
In general, when both latches are up, it is impossible to perform only the action of closing
the suitcase; one must also concurrently toggle at least one of the latches. If this seems
unintuitive, recall that we have chosen to model the suitcase being open as a static effect
of the latches being up, so there is no time in any causally possible world at which both
latches are up and the suitcase is closed.
5.3. Additional expressive possibilities
The previous example demonstrates that UCL can be used to represent some standard
features of action domains, such as indirect effects of actions, implied action preconditions
and concurrent actions. Next we briefly describe a few of the additional expressive
possibilities of the approach.
2 Thus, the inertia laws for the Suitcase domain can also be represented by the pair of schemas
ft ∧ ft+1 ⊃ Cft+1
¬ft ∧¬ft+1 ⊃ C¬ft+1
where f is a metavariable for fluent names. In other cases, there may be inertial fluents that are not designated by
fluent names or their negations, and, conversely, there may be fluent names or negations of fluent names that do
not designate inertial fluents. We will see an example of this in Section 5.3.3. A still more general form of inertia
is discussed in Section 5.3.5.
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5.3.1. Ramification and qualification constraints
Ramification and qualification constraints, in the sense of Lin and Reiter [35], are
formalized by schemas of the forms Cσt and σt , respectively, where σ (the “state
constraint”) is a fluent designating formula. We will consider this claim in more detail
in Section 7.
5.3.2. Nondeterministic actions
The semantics of UCL rests on the principle of universal causation, according to which
every fact is caused. Intuitively, in the case of a nondeterministic action, there is no cause
for one of its possible effects rather than another. We have already seen, however—in
standard schemas (13) through (17)—that there are ways of effectively exempting facts
from the principle of universal causation. We can use laws of a similar form to describe
nondeterministic actions. For instance, coin tossing can be described (in part) as follows.
Tosst ∧Headst+1 ⊃ C Headst+1 (18)
Tosst ∧¬Headst+1 ⊃ C¬Headst+1 . (19)
Intuitively, according to schemas (18) and (19), for every time t , Tosst renders Headst+1
exogenous. We’ll consider some related results in Section 9.3.
5.3.3. Defined fluents
Given an L(F ,A,T ) domain description, we add a defined fluent f (f /∈ F ) by first
adding f to the set of fluent names and then defining f by means of a schema
C(ft ≡ σt )
where σ is a fluent designating formula that doesn’t mention f . It is important that the set I
used to designate the inertial fluents is not altered in this process. Intuitively speaking, the
defined fluent inherits any inertial properties it may have from its definiens. The correctness
of this method of introducing defined fluents follows from the remarks on definitional
extension in Section 3.
5.3.4. Delayed effects and things that change by themselves
Because we refer explicitly to time points in our action descriptions, we may, if we
wish, describe actions with delayed effects. We may also model things that change by
themselves. This we can do simply by writing causal laws that relate fluents at different
times, without mentioning any actions. (Alternatively, we may explicitly introduce
“events”, which, like actions, can be conceived to be the causes of change.)
Consider an example from [40] along these lines, involving the dynamic mechanism of
falling dominos. We wish to describe the chain reaction of four dominos falling over one
after the other, after the first domino is tipped over. We describe the direct effect and action
precondition of the Tip action by writing
Tipt ⊃ C¬Up(1)t+1 (20)
Tipt ⊃Up(1)t . (21)
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According to (20), Tip is the action of tipping over the first domino. According to (21),
it can only be done if the first domino is standing upright. We describe the chain reaction
mechanism as follows, where d is a metavariable ranging over the numbers 1, 2, 3.
Up(d)t ∧¬Up(d)t+1 ⊃ C¬Up(d + 1)t+2. (22)
Notice that (22) does not mention an action. It describes dynamic change involving three
distinct time points. Roughly speaking, if domino d falls in the interval from t to t + 1,
then domino d + 1 is caused to fall in the interval from t + 1 to t + 2.
5.3.5. Generalized commonsense law of inertia
The fact that the commonsense law of inertia can be expressed straightforwardly in UCL
makes it easy to generalize, as follows. Rather than supposing that things tend to stay the
same, we can imagine more generally that they tend to change in particular ways. That is,
there is a course that nature would follow, in the absence of interventions.
As an example, consider the Pendulum domain from [20]. In the course of nature, a
pendulum swings back and forth, from right to left and back again. However, at any time
an agent can intervene by holding the pendulum in its current location. When the agent
no longer holds it, the pendulum resumes its natural course, swinging back and forth. The
effects of the action Hold are specified by writing
Holdt ∧Rightt ⊃ C Rightt+1
Holdt ∧¬Rightt ⊃ C¬Rightt+1 .
The behavior of the pendulum in the absence of interventions is described by writing
¬Rightt ∧Rightt+1 ⊃ C Rightt+1 (23)
Rightt ∧¬Rightt+1 ⊃ C¬Rightt+1 . (24)
Like the standard inertia schema (17), schemas (23) and (24) describe a course of nature.
Here the course of nature is dynamic rather than static, but otherwise there are clear
similarities. Like (17), axioms (23) and (24) allow for the possibility that the course of
nature may be overridden by the effects of actions, and they do so without mentioning
facts about the nonoccurrence of actions as preconditions. So, in essence, these axioms
solve the frame problem for the dynamic fluent Right in the same way that standard inertia
axioms solve the frame problem for inertial fluents.
6. UCL and default logic
In this section, we establish the close mathematical relationship between UCL and
default logic [47]. More precisely, we consider a generalization of default logic, called
disjunctive default logic [17], which includes Reiter’s default logic as a special case.
The semantics of a disjunctive default theory is given in terms of its extensions, which
are logically closed sets of (nonmodal) formulas that satisfy a certain fixpoint condition.
Although an extension may be inconsistent, or incomplete (that is, there may be an atom
p such that neither p nor ¬p belong to it), we will be interested in the special case
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of extensions that are both consistent and complete, since it is these extensions that
correspond to interpretations.
We will specify a translation from disjunctive default logic to UCL such that the
complete, consistent extensions correspond to the causally explained interpretations. The
translation is invertible, so there is a strong sense in which UCL is equivalent to disjunctive
default logic, restricted to the special case of complete, consistent extensions.
Since disjunctive logic programming under the answer set semantics [14] can be
understood as a special case of disjunctive default logic, as established in [17], this
translation also yields a correspondence between UCL and logic programming, which
makes possible automated reasoning using fast improving, publicly available systems such
as SMODELS [44], DLV [9] and DeReS [7]. (In fact, DeReS can even work directly with
default theories.)
6.1. Disjunctive default logic
Here we recall definitions from [17].
A disjunctive default rule is an expression of the form
α : β1, . . . , βm
γ1| · · · |γn (25)
where all of α,β1, . . . , βm, γ1, . . . , γn are (nonmodal) formulas (m> 0, n> 1).
A disjunctive default theory is a set of disjunctive default rules. Let D be a disjunctive
default theory and E a set of formulas. Define DE as follows.
DE =
{
α
γ1| · · · |γn :
α : β1, . . . , βm
γ1| · · · |γn ∈D and ¬β1, . . . ,¬βm /∈E
}
.
A set E′ of formulas is closed under DE if, for every member of DE , if α ∈E′ then at
least one of γ1, . . . , γn belongs to E′. We say E is an extension for D if E is minimal
among sets closed under propositional logic and closed under DE . We say E is complete
if, for every atom p, either p ∈E or ¬p ∈E. Notice that, for the purpose of computing
complete, consistent extensions, the justifications β1, . . . , βm of a disjunctive default rule
can be safely replaced with their conjunction.
Reiter’s default logic corresponds to the special case when n= 1. 3
6.2. UCL and disjunctive default logic
Given a disjunctive default theoryD, let ucl(D) be the UCL theory obtained fromD by
replacing each disjunctive default rule (25) with the UCL formula
Cα ∧ β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm ⊃ Cγ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cγn. (26)
3 In Reiter’s formulation, a default theory is a pair (D,W), where the second component W is a set of formulas.
Here we suppress the second component, since every φ ∈W can be equivalently represented by the justification-
free rule >:φ .
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It is a fact of propositional S5 modal logic that every theory is equivalent to one in which
every formula has the form (26). 4 Thus, every UCL theory is equivalent to one that can
be obtained by this translation from disjunctive default logic.
Given a set S of interpretations, let Th(S) denote the set of nonmodal formulas true in
all members of S. Given a set Γ of nonmodal formulas, let Mod(Γ ) denote the set of
interpretations that satisfy all members of Γ .
Theorem 4. For any disjunctive default theory D and any interpretation I , Th({I }) is an
extension for D if and only if I is causally explained by ucl(D).
Lemma 5. For any disjunctive default theory D and UCL structure (I, S), (I, S) |=
ucl(D) if and only if Th(S) is closed under DTh({I }).
Proof. (⇒) Assume that (I, S) |= ucl(D). Consider any rule
α
γ1| · · · |γn
in DTh({I }) such that α ∈ Th(S). We must show that at least one of γ1, . . . , γn is in Th(S).
We know there is a rule
α : β1, . . . , βm
γ1| · · · |γn
in D such that I satisfies all of β1, . . . , βm. It follows that
Cα ∧ β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm ⊃ Cγ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cγn
is in ucl(D), and that (I, S) |= β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm. Since α ∈ Th(S), (I, S) |= Cα. Since
(I, S) |= ucl(D), we can conclude that (I, S) |= Cγ1 ∨ · · · ∨Cγn. Thus, there is an
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (I, S) |= Cγi , and consequently γi ∈ Th(S).
(⇐) Assume that Th(S) is closed underDTh({I }). Consider any formula
Cα ∧ β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm ⊃ Cγ1 ∨ · · · ∨ Cγn
from ucl(D) whose antecedent is satisfied by (I, S). We must show that (I, S) satisfies at
least one of Cγ1, . . . ,Cγn. We know that
α : β1, . . . , βm
γ1| · · · |γn
belongs to D. Because (I, S) |= β1 ∧ · · · ∧ βm, we know that ¬β1, . . . ,¬βm /∈ Th({I }).
Therefore,
α
γ1| · · · |γn
belongs to DTh({I }). And because (I, S) |= Cα, we know that α ∈ Th(S). Since Th(S) is
closed underDTh({I }), we can conclude that at least one of γ1, . . . , γn is in Th(S). It follows
that (I, S) satisfies at least one of Cγ1, . . . ,Cγn. 2
4 This follows, for instance, from the MCNF theorem in [24].
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Proof of Theorem 4. (⇒) Assume that Th({I }) is an extension for D. We know by
Lemma 5 that (I, {I }) |= ucl(D). Let S be a superset of {I } such that (I, S) |= ucl(D).
By Lemma 5, Th(S) is closed under DTh({I }). Because I ∈ S, Th(S)⊆ Th({I }). And
since Th({I }) is a minimal among sets closed under DTh({I }), we can conclude that
Th(S)= Th({I }), from which it follows that S = {I }. So (I, {I }) is the unique I -model
of ucl(D). That is, I is causally explained by ucl(D).
(⇐) Assume I is causally explained by ucl(D). So (I, {I }) |= ucl(D). By Lemma 5,
Th({I }) is closed under DTh({I }). Let E be a subset of Th({I }) that is closed under
propositional logic and under DTh({I }). By Lemma 5, (I,Mod(E)) |= ucl(D). Since
(I, {I }) is the unique I -model of ucl(D), we have Mod(E)= {I }. It follows that
E = Th({I }). We can conclude that Th({I }) is a minimal set closed under propositional
logic and under DTh({I }). That is, Th({I }) is an extension for D. 2
In the statement of Theorem 4, we restrict attention to extensions that can be expressed
in the form Th({I }), where I is an interpretation. That is, we consider only complete,
consistent extensions. This restriction can of course be expressed in the default theory
itself, simply by adding the justification > to each justification-free default rule (to
guarantee that all extensions are consistent), and also adding the default rule
: p,¬p
⊥
for each atom p in the language (to guarantee that all extensions are complete).
7. More on actions and change in UCL
On the basis of Theorem 4, UCL inherits results on reasoning about action and theory
update from [38,46,51]. Here we describe some of these.
In [38], we gave a uniform account of ramification and qualification constraints (in the
sense of Lin and Reiter [35]), using inference rules to express static causal laws. There the
central definition identifies the states that can result from performing an action with “di-
rect” effect E in a state S, in a world with causal relationships characterized by a set C of
inference rules. This definition of “possible next states” is given by a fixpoint condition that
can be seen to reflect the principle of universal causation, understood in a less general fash-
ion. Here we recall the definition from [38], beginning with a few preliminary definitions.
Consider a propositional language in which the atoms are fluent names. Intuitively, an
interpretation of this language represents a state of the world. We will understand an infer-
ence rule φ/ψ in this language to express the static causal law “ψ is caused whenever φ
is”. Let Γ be a set of formulas. We say that Γ is closed under a set C of inference rules,
if, for every inference rule φ/ψ in C, if φ belongs to Γ , so does ψ . We write Γ `C φ if φ
belongs to the least set of formulas closed under C and closed under propositional logic.
Let C be a set of inference rules. Let S and S′ be interpretations. (Recall that we identify
an interpretation with the set of literals true in it.) Let E be a set of formulas. We say that
S′ can result from causing E in S relative to C if
S′ = {L : (S ∩ S′)∪E `C L}
where L stands exclusively for literals.
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In [46], this definition was explored in the more abstract setting of theory update. There
we showed (Theorem 8.1) that it can be simply embedded in default logic, using inertia
rules closely related to the UCL inertia axioms from Section 5, as follows.
Proposition 6. Let C be a set of inference rules, S an interpretation, and E a set of
formulas. An interpretation S′ can result from causing E in S relative to C if and only
if Th(S′) is an extension of the default theory{> :L
L
:L ∈ S
}
∪
{> :
φ
: φ ∈E
}
∪
{
φ :
ψ
: φ/ψ ∈ C
}
.
Using this result, along with Theorem 4, we immediately obtain the following.
Corollary 7. Let C be a set of inference rules, S an interpretation, andE a set of formulas.
An interpretation S′ can result from causingE in S relative to C if and only if S′ is causally
explained by the UCL theory
{L⊃ CL :L ∈ S} ∪ {Cφ : φ ∈E} ∪ {Cφ ⊃ Cψ : φ/ψ ∈ C} . (27)
Here the inertial property of each literal L that is true in the initial state S is captured by
the formula L⊃ CL, which can be understood to say that L is caused in a subsequent state
S′ if it is true in S′.
Corollary 7 shows that the static causal laws from [38] correspond to UCL formulas of
the form
Cφ ⊃ Cψ
where φ and ψ are nonmodal formulas.
Similarly, UCL formulas of the form
Cφ
where φ is nonmodal, correspond to traditional ramification constraints. Here we validate
this claim with respect to Winslett’s classic, minimal-change definition of theory update
[53], which can be stated as follows.
Let Γ be a set of formulas and S an interpretation. We say a model S′ of Γ is a minimal-
change update of S by Γ if there is no model S′′ of Γ such that S′ ∩ S is a proper subset
of S′′ ∩ S.
Proposition 8. Let Γ be a set of formulas and S an interpretation. An interpretation S′
is a minimal-change update of S by Γ if and only if S′ is causally explained by the UCL
theory
{L⊃ CL :L ∈ S} ∪ {Cφ : φ ∈ Γ }. (28)
Proposition 8 follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3 in [38], along with
Corollary 7 above.
H. Turner / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 87–123 103
In a similar vein, it is clear that a nonmodal formula φ, if added to (28) or (27), would act
as a qualification constraint (again in the sense of Lin and Reiter [35]), simply eliminating
the causally explained interpretations that fail to satisfy the constraint φ.
In [51], a high-level action language AC was defined, in the manner of the action
language AR0 of Kartha and Lifschitz [25], and an embedding into default logic was
established. The language AC uses a slight extension of the definition of possible next
states from [38], allowing for explicitly defined fluents and nondeterministic direct effects
of actions. Like its predecessors AR0 and A [15], AC is based on the situation calculus
[42]. The embedding of AC into default logic, along with Theorem 4 embedding default
logic into UCL, shows that UCL can be used to express theories in the situation calculus,
although we do not explore that possibility in this paper.
When actions are not always executable, situation calculus theories must include an
additional predicate—typically named Poss—that characterizes when it is possible to
perform an action in a situation, and when a situation can be reached by a sequence of
actions. In general, when the preconditions for executability of actions are not explicitly
given, the mathematics of Poss can be rather complex, as hinted at in footnote 5 of [33].
Even when action preconditions are given explicitly, as is required in the translation of AC
into default logic in [51], the additional predicate and associated axioms complicate the
theory. By contrast, when time has a linear structure and action occurrences are represented
by propositions, as in the L(F ,A,T ) languages from Section 5.1, the question of whether
an action can be performed in a particular situation need not be explicitly addressed in
the theory. Instead, if an action can be performed in a situation, there will be, roughly
speaking, some causally possible world in which it actually is. 5 For this reason, we find
it convenient to suppress the role of the situation calculus when we describe the action
theories from [51]. We will do the same when we consider in Section 9 the causal action
theories of Lin [33,34].
In [51], inertia is expressed by default rules that, in light of Theorem 4, correspond
(essentially) to the UCL schemas
Cft ∧ ft+1 ⊃ Cft+1 (29)
C¬ft ∧¬ft+1 ⊃ C¬ft+1 (30)
where f is a metavariable ranging over fluent names. Notice that these inertia schemas
differ from the corresponding inertia schema (17) in Section 5.2. There C is not applied
to ft and ¬ft . The negative occurrences of C in (29) and (30) make them weaker (in S5)
than their counterparts from Section 5.2. Similarly, static causal laws in [51] correspond to
formulas of the form
Cσt ⊃ Cσ ′t (31)
where σ and σ ′ are fluent designating formulas. Here again we see a negative occurrence
of C. Notice that formula (31) is an S5-consequence of σt ⊃ Cσ ′t , whose form corresponds
to that of the static causal laws in Section 5.2.
5 A similar idea is made precise in [40], where the executability of a plan is defined for L(F ,A,T ) domain
descriptions (expressed as causal theories).
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The formalizations of action domains as default theories in [51], along with Theorem 4,
suggests the following alternative UCL formalization of Lin’s Suitcase domain. We begin
with four domain specific schemas, where l is metavariable ranging over {L1,L2}.
C(Toggle(l)t ∧Up(l)t )⊃ C¬Up(l)t+1 (32)
C(Toggle(l)t ∧¬Up(l)t )⊃ CUp(l)t+1 (33)
C Closet ⊃ C¬ IsOpent+1 (34)
C(Up(L1)t ∧Up(L2)t )⊃ C IsOpent . (35)
To this we add the formulas given by standard schemas (13)–(16) as before, along with the
alternative inertia schemas (29) and (30).
Notice that (32)–(35) can be obtained from the corresponding schemas in the Suitcase
description from Section 5.2 simply by applying the modal operator C to each antecedent.
Despite the new, negative occurrences of C, it is possible to show that this formalization
of the Suitcase domain yields the same causally explained interpretations as the UCL
formalization considered in Section 5.2.
The following result establishes the inclusion in one direction. (We do not establish here
the other direction of inclusion.)
Proposition 9. Let T be a UCL theory in which C is applied only to nonmodal formulas.
Assume also that all occurrences of the connective ≡ have been eliminated from T . Let
T ′ be obtained from T by replacing, in every formula of T , every negative occurrence of
a subformula of the form Cφ with φ. Any interpretation causally explained by T is also
causally explained by T ′.
This result can be proved on the basis of the following observations. For any UCL
structure (I, S) and nonmodal formula φ, if (I, {I }) |= ¬Cφ then (I, {I }) |= ¬φ, and if
(I, S) 6|= ¬Cφ then (I, S) 6|= ¬φ.
To see that, in general, the converse of Proposition 9 does not hold, consider UCL
theories T = {Cp ⊃ Cp} and T ′ = {p ⊃ Cp}, with p the only atom in the language. The
interpretation {p} is causally explained by T ′, but not by T .
8. A subset of UCL in circumscription
Let T be a finite UCL theory, with a finite signature, in which the operator C is applied
only to literals. In this section, we show that T can be reduced to a circumscriptive theory
ct(T ). 6
The language L of ct(T ) is a second-order language with equality, with two sorts, atom
and value. Let At stand for the set of atoms in the language of T . In L, the set of all object
constants of sort atom is exactly the set At. The symbols True and False will be the two
object constants of sort value. L includes exactly two predicates, in addition to equality:
6 Familiarity with circumscription will be assumed. See, for example, [29].
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a unary predicate Holds of sort atom and a binary predicate Caused of sort atom× value.
We will use a variable x of sort atom, and a variable v of sort value.
We begin the description of ct(T ) by letting C(T ) stand for the sentence∧
φ∈T
C(φ)
where C(φ) is defined recursively, as follows.
C(p) = Holds(p) if p ∈ At
C(Cp) = Caused(p,True) if p ∈ At
C(C¬p) = Caused(p,False) if p ∈ At
C(>) = >
C(⊥) = ⊥
C(¬φ) = ¬C(φ)
C((φ ψ)) = (C(φ) C(ψ)).
Here  stands for any of the binary propositional connectives. Notice that this definition
depends on the finiteness of the UCL theory T , as well as the assumption that the modal
operator C is applied only to literals. Notice also that C(T ) is ground.
We’ll want a unique names axiom (UNA) to say that all object constants of sort atom
denote distinct domain objects. Thus, UNA stands for the conjunction of all formulasp 6= q
such that p and q are distinct members of At. Notice that this definition depends on the
finiteness of the signature of T .
The complete embedding ct(T ) consists of the following five sentences.
CIRC[C(T ) : Caused] (36)
∀x(Holds(x)≡ Caused(x,True)) (37)
∀x(¬Holds(x)≡ Caused(x,False)) (38)
UNA (39)
∀v(v = True 6≡ v = False). (40)
Notice that second-order quantification is used only implicitly in the embedding ct(T ), in
(36). The models of (36) are simply the models of C(T ) in which the extent of Caused
is minimal (for a fixed universe and fixed interpretation of all nonlogical constants except
Caused).
For every model M of ct(T ), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the domain
objects of sort atom and the members of At. To see this, first notice that, because of
the UNA, M maps each pair of distinct members of At to distinct domain objects. Now,
suppose there is a domain object δ of sort atom such that M maps no member of At to δ.
Because C(T ) is ground, and M is a model of C(T ) in which the extent of the predicate
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Caused is minimal, we can conclude that neither 〈δ,TrueM〉 nor 〈δ,FalseM 〉 belong to
CausedM. But the axioms (37) and (38) together imply that
∀x(Caused(x,True) 6≡ Caused(x,False)). (41)
Given, in addition, the axiom (40) expressing the unique names and domain closure
assumptions for sort values, we can conclude that every model of ct(T ) is isomorphic to
some Herbrand model of ct(T ). Thus, in what follows, we restrict our attention to Herbrand
interpretations.
For every UCL structure (I, S), let M(I,S) be the Herbrand interpretation of L such
that, for every p ∈ At, the following three conditions hold.
– M(I,S) |=Holds(p) iff (I, S) |= p
– M(I,S) |= Caused(p,True) iff (I, S) |= Cp
– M(I,S) |= Caused(p,False) iff (I, S) |= C¬p.
The following lemma is a straightforward consequence of the definitions.
Lemma 10. Let T be a finite UCL theory, with finite signature, in which C is applied only
to literals. For any UCL structure (I, S), (I, S) |= T if and only if M(I,S) |= C(T ).
Theorem 11. Let T be a finite UCL theory, with finite signature, in which C is applied
only to literals. An interpretation I is causally explained by T if and only if M(I, {I })
is a model of ct(T ). Moreover, every model of ct(T ) is isomorphic to an interpretation
M(I, {I }), for some interpretation I of the language of T .
Proof. We’ve already established that every model of ct(T ) is isomorphic to a Herbrand
model. In light of (37) and (38), every Herbrand model can be written in the form
M(I, {I }). Now we turn to the first part of the theorem.
(⇒) Assume I is causally explained by T . Thus, (I, {I }) |= T . By Lemma 10,
M(I, {I }) |= C(T ). Also, M(I, {I }) clearly satisfies (37)–(40). It remains only to show
that the extent of Caused in M(I, {I }) is minimal among models of C(T ) with the same
universe, and the same interpretation of all nonlogical constants except Caused. Any
possible counterexample can be written in the form M(I,S), for some superset S of {I }.
So assume that M(I,S) |= C(T ). By Lemma 10, (I, S) |= T . Since (I, {I }) is the unique
I -model of T , S = {I }.
(⇐) Assume M(I, {I }) is a model of ct(T ). By Lemma 10, (I, {I }) |= T. Let S be
a superset of {I } such that (I, S) |= T . By Lemma 10, M(I,S) |= C(T ). Because the
extent of Caused in M(I, {I }) is minimal among Herbrand models of C(T ) with the
same interpretation of all nonlogical constants except Caused, we can conclude that
M(I,S)=M(I, {I }). It follows that S = {I }. Hence (I, {I }) is the unique I -model of
T . That is, I is causally explained by T . 2
Notice that any UCL theory of the form allowed by Theorem 11 is S5-equivalent to
a UCL theory whose sentences have the form (26) with α a conjunction of literals and
all βi ’s and γi ’s literals as well. By Theorem 4, such a UCL theory corresponds to a
disjunctive default theory, which itself, because of its “restriction to literals”, corresponds
to a disjunctive logic program under the answer set semantics, as established in [17].
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Hence, given our Theorem 4, the essence of Theorem 11 above can be deduced from
Theorem 5.2 (along with subsequent remarks) in [36], where an embedding of disjunctive
logic programming into circumscription is described.
9. UCL and Lin’s causal action theories
Lin [33] recently introduced a causal approach to reasoning about action based on
circumscription. In this section, we explore the relationship between Lin’s circumscriptive
action theories and the UCL action theories described in Section 5, restricted to the case
when C is applied only to literals. We show that on a wide range of action domains, the
two approaches coincide.
9.1. Lin’s circumscriptive action theories
For the purpose of comparison, we present an account of Lin’s proposal that is simplified
in several ways. We do not consider nonpropositional fluent and action symbols. We
also do not employ the situation calculus. Instead we model worlds in which time has
the structure of the natural numbers. As discussed in Section 7, this simplifies matters
somewhat, eliminating the need for a Poss predicate. Finally, we include a domain closure
assumption for fluents. In the case of propositional fluents, this is not very significant.
In some other ways, the circumscriptive approach that we describe is more general than
Lin’s. Because our language includes propositions about the occurrence and nonoccurrence
of actions, we can accommodate concurrent actions more easily than Lin. We also
accommodate a wider variety of causal laws. For instance, we allow formulas expressing
causal laws that refer to more than one time point and yet do not involve the occurrence of
an action. We allow also for causal laws that involve more than two time points, and we do
not require that the time points be successive.
The language of the circumscriptive theory is constructed in the same manner as in the
previous section, on the basis of the signature At of an underlying propositional language.
For this purpose, we employ L(F ,A,T ) languages, as described in Section 5.1, under the
additional restriction that each of the sets F , A, and T is finite.
For present purposes, we will say that a Lin formula is the conjunction of a finite set
of ground sentences in which Caused appears only positively, and at most once in each
sentence.
The next few observations help characterize the relationship between Lin formulas as
specified here and the kinds of circumscriptive action theories described in [33]. Assume
that σ is a fluent designating formula, A is an action name, F is a fluent name, and V is
either True or False. We will write Holds(σt ) to stand for the formula obtained by replacing
every occurrence of every fluent atom ft in σt by Holds(ft ). Lin’s “direct effect” axioms
correspond to schemas of the form
Holds(At )∧Holds(σt )⊃ Caused(Ft+1,V ). (42)
Lin’s “causal rule” axioms correspond to schemas of the form
Holds(σt )⊃ Caused(Ft ,V ). (43)
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Lin’s “explicit precondition” axioms correspond to schemas of the form
Holds(At )⊃Holds(σt ).
Lin’s “qualification state constraint” axioms correspond to schemas of the form
Holds(σt ).
For example, consider again the Suitcase domain from [33]. We’ll use almost the same
L(F ,A,T ) language as in Section 5.2, but restrict time to a finite initial segment of
the natural numbers. The Lin formula for this example is characterized by the following
schemas of type (42) and (43), where l is again metavariable ranging over {L1,L2}.
Holds(Toggle(l)t )∧Holds(Up(l)t )⊃ Caused(Up(l)t+1,False) (44)
Holds(Toggle(l)t )∧¬Holds(Up(l)t )⊃ Caused(Up(l)t+1,True) (45)
Holds(Closet )⊃ Caused(IsOpent+1,False) (46)
Holds(Up(L1)t )∧Holds(Up(L2)t )⊃ Caused(IsOpent ,True). (47)
Let T5 be the UCL theory given by schemas (9)–(12), which express the domain specific
part of the UCL description of the Suitcase domain from Section 5.2. The conjunction
of the sentences given by schemas (44)–(47) is exactly C(T5), where C is the translation
function defined in Section 8.
Given a Lin formulaD, the complete circumscriptive action theory cat(D) consists of
CIRC[D : Caused]
along with a number of additional axioms, as follows.
We need axioms expressing domain closure and unique names assumptions for both
sorts, which can be written as follows.
∀x
(∨
p∈At
x = p
)
(48)
∧
p,q∈At,p 6=q
p 6= q (49)
∀v(v = True 6≡ v = False). (50)
We also need the following axioms, saying that whatever is caused is true.
∀x(Caused(x,True)⊃Holds(x)) (51)
∀x(Caused(x,False)⊃¬Holds(x)). (52)
Finally, we need the inertia axioms given by the schema
Holds(ft+1)≡
(
Holds(ft )∧¬Caused(ft+1,False)
)∨ Caused(ft+1,True) (53)
where f is a metavariable ranging over fluent names.
Notice the similarity between the circumscriptive action theories cat(D) defined here
and the circumscriptive theories ct(T ) from Section 8. In both cases, Caused is minimized
in one part of the theory, and the result is conjoined with several additional axioms. Two
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differences are especially interesting. Roughly speaking, axioms (37) and (38) of ct(T )
are replaced here with the weaker (51) and (52). Intuitively, this is because models of
Lin’s circumscriptive action theories are not required to satisfy the principle of universal
causation. On the other hand, the inertia schema (53) that is built into Lin’s theory has
no immediate counterpart in ct(T ), since inertia is expressed directly in UCL action
descriptions (that is, by means of formulas of T , which are translated just like any other
formulas in T ).
9.2. Lin’s circumscriptive action theories in UCL
The first thing to observe is that, for every Lin formula D, there is a UCL theory T
in language L(F ,A,T ) such that C(T ) = D. We will show that there is an extension
uclat(D) of T such that the interpretations causally explained by uclat(D) correspond
to the models of cat(D). We obtain uclat(D) by adding to T the formulas given by the
standard schemas (13)–(17) from Section 5.2, taking I to be the set of all fluent names
and their negations. (In light of Theorem 1, any such UCL theory can be expressed as a
causal theory. Similarly, by Theorem 3, any such UCL theory has a concise translation into
classical propositional logic.)
Theorem 12. For any Lin formula D, an interpretation I is causally explained by
uclat(D) if and only if there is a superset S of {I } such that M(I,S) is a model of cat(D).
Moreover, every model of cat(D) is isomorphic to an interpretation M(I,S), for some
UCL structure (I, S).
The following easy corollary provides a weaker but more immediate description of the
sense in which Lin’s circumscriptive causal theories of action are captured in UCL.
Corollary 13. For any Lin formula D,
– for any model M of the corresponding circumscriptive action theory cat(D), there
is an interpretation I causally explained by uclat(D) such that, for all fluents f and
times t ,
M |=Holds(ft ) iff I |= ft
– for any interpretation I causally explained by uclat(D), there is a modelM of cat(D)
such that, for all fluents f and times t ,
M |=Holds(ft ) iff I |= ft .
We begin the proof of Theorem 12 with a straightforward lemma.
Lemma 14. Let T be a UCL theory with no nested occurrences of C, in which C occurs
only positively. If (I, S) |= T , then for all subsets S′ of S such that I ∈ S′, (I, S′) |= T .
If, in addition, C occurs at most once in each formula, then (I, S ∪ S′) |= T whenever
(I, S) |= T and (I, S′) |= T .
110 H. Turner / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 87–123
Proof of Theorem 12. Axioms (48)–(50) allow us to consider only Herbrand models of
cat(D). Axioms (51) and (52) show that every Herbrand model of cat(D) can be expressed
in the form M(I,S), for some UCL structure (I, S). That proves the second part of the
theorem. Now we turn to the first.
Let T be the UCL theory such that C(T )=D. (Here we assume the most natural choice
of T , which satisfies the conditions of Lemma 14.) Let T ′ = uclat(D).
(⇒) Assume I is causally explained by T ′. Thus, (I, {I }) |= T , and by Lemma 10,
M(I, {I }) |=D. It follows that there is a superset S of {I } such that M(I,S) is a model
of CIRC[D : Caused]. Clearly, M(I,S) satisfies the standard axioms (48)–(52). It remains
to show that M(I,S) satisfies the inertia axioms given by (53). Suppose otherwise. Thus,
there is a fluent atom ft such that either
M(I,S) |= ¬Holds(ft )∧Holds(ft+1)∧¬Caused(ft+1,True)
or
M(I,S) |=Holds(ft )∧¬Holds(ft+1)∧¬Caused(ft+1,False).
We now argue the first case. (The second is similar.) By Lemma 10, (I, S) |= ¬ft ∧
ft+1 ∧ ¬Cft+1. Let I ′ = I ∪ {¬ft+1} \ {ft+1}. Notice that I ′ 6= I , with I |= ft+1 and
I ′ |= ¬ft+1. Since M(I,S) 6|= Caused(ft+1,True) and I ∈ S , we can conclude by choice
of I ′ that M(I,S)=M(I,S ∪ {I ′}). Thus, M(I,S ∪ {I ′}) |=D, and by Lemma 10,
(I, S ∪ {I ′}) |= T . By Lemma 14, (I, {I, I ′}) |= T . One easily verifies that (I, {I, I ′}) also
satisfies (13)–(17). So (I, {I, I ′}) |= T ′, which contradicts the assumption that I is causally
explained by T ′.
(⇐) Assume M(I,S) is a model of cat(D). So M(I,S) |=D. By Lemma 10,
(I, S) |= T . By Lemma 14, (I, {I }) |= T . One easily verifies that, since T ′ is obtained from
T by adding (13)–(17), (I, {I }) |= T ′. We wish to show that (I, {I }) is the unique I -model
of T ′. Suppose otherwise. So there is a strict superset S′ of {I } such that (I, S′) |= T ′,
and there is a literal L such that (I, S′) |= L∧¬CL. In light of (13)–(16), L is a fluent
literal that refers to a non-zero time. Assume L has the form ft+1. (The argument is
analogous if L is ¬ft+1.) So (I, S′) |= ft+1 ∧¬Cft+1. In light of (17), (I, S′) |= ¬ft .
So (I, S′) |= ¬ft ∧ ft+1, and thus (I, S) |= ¬ft ∧ ft+1 also. Hence, by Lemma 10,
M(I,S) |= ¬Holds(ft )∧Holds(ft+1).
So by (53),M(I,S) |= Caused(ft+1,True). On the other hand, since (I, S′) 6|= Cft+1,
M(I,S′) 6|= Caused(ft+1,True),
again by Lemma 10. Consequently, M(I,S ∪ S′) 6|= Caused(ft+1,True), which shows
that M(I,S ∪ S′) 6=M(I,S). Since (I, S′) |= T ′, (I, S′) |= T . Since (I, S) |= T also,
we know by Lemma 14 that (I, S ∪ S′) |= T . Hence M(I,S ∪ S′) |=D, once more by
Lemma 10. Since M(I,S) is a model of CIRC[D : Caused], we can conclude that
M(I,S ∪ S′)=M(I,S), thus reaching contradiction. 2
9.3. Discussion
In [33], Lin briefly discusses the possibility of using a more general form of “causal
rule” axiom (43), in which Caused can occur negatively any number of times in a
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sentence, in addition to the one positive occurrence. For example, he suggests extending the
circumscriptive action theory for the Suitcase domain with an additional fluent IsClosed,
understood as the antonym of IsOpen, and adding (essentially) the schemas
Caused(IsClosedt ,True)≡ Caused(IsOpent ,False) (54)
Caused(IsClosedt ,False)≡ Caused(IsOpent ,True) (55)
to reflect this understanding. Notice that this resembles the notion of a “defined fluent”,
discussed in Section 5.3.3, according to which one would augment the UCL Suitcase
domain description T4 from Section 5.2 with
C(IsClosedt ≡¬ IsOpent ). (56)
The first thing to observe is that (56) entails IsClosedt ≡¬ IsOpent (in S5), while (54) and
(55) do not entail
Holds(IsClosedt )≡¬Holds(IsOpent ). (57)
This correctly suggests that some models of the circumscriptive action theory fail to
satisfy (57), for some time names t . 7 It appears that, in the case of this example, one
can obtain a more satisfactory “definition” of IsClosed by also including (57) in the
circumscriptive theory. In general though, it is unclear how to introduce defined fluents
in Lin’s circumscriptive action theories.
A related complication arises if we try, for instance, to replace the causal rule axiom (47)
with
Caused(Up(L1)t ,True)∧ Caused(Up(L2)t ,True)⊃ Caused(IsOpent ,True)
(which is closely related to schema (35) from the alternative UCL Suitcase domain formal-
ization in Section 7). This replacement greatly alters the meaning of the circumscriptive
action theory. For instance, it allows models that fail to satisfy
Holds(Up(L1)t )∧Holds(Up(L2)t )⊃Holds(IsOpent ).
It also makes it impossible, intuitively speaking, to open the suitcase unless one toggles
both latches at the same time.
In a subsequent paper [34], Lin investigates how to extend his circumscriptive action
theories to accommodate nondeterministic actions. For our purposes, the first thing to
observe is that nondeterministic actions can typically be described using the natural
counterpart to the approach from Section 5.3.2. For instance, one can describe the
nondeterministic effect of coin tossing by the schemas
Holds(Tosst )∧Holds(Headst+1)⊃ Caused(Headst+1,True) (58)
Holds(Tosst )∧¬Holds(Headst+1)⊃ Caused(Headst+1,False) (59)
which correspond to the UCL schemas (18) and (19) from Section 5.3.2. Lin does
not (directly) consider this approach. Instead, he begins by considering a variety of
7 In such models, (57) is false for some initial segment of time names, until, intuitively, some action causes the
suitcase to open or close, at which point, roughly speaking, (54) and (55) finally come into play.
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methods involving sentences with multiple positive occurrences of Caused. For instance,
he (essentially) considers a coin-toss axiom like
Holds(Tosst )⊃ Caused(Headst+1,True)∨ Caused(Headst+1,False). (60)
Notice that, in the presence of standard axioms (51) and (52) guaranteeing that whatever
is caused obtains, one can equivalently replace (60) with (58) and (59). In UCL, the
corresponding formula
Tosst ⊃ C Headst+1∨C¬Headst+1
also works, since it is S5-equivalent to the conjunction of (18) and (19). But in general
such approaches do not translate faithfully into UCL. For instance, if we were to add an
action GetOneUp to the Suitcase domain, using the UCL schema
GetOneUpt ⊃ C Up(L1)t+1 ∨ C Up(L2)t+1
to describe its effects, the action would never cause the second latch to go up, when
performed alone, if the first latch was already up.
Lin shows particular interest in two special cases of nondeterministic effects, which
he calls “inclusive” and “exclusive”. Inclusive nondeterminism corresponds, in the UCL
setting, to families of effect axioms of the following form, where A is an action name, and
σ 0, σ 1, . . . , σ n are fluent designating formulas.
At ∧ σ 0t ⊃ Cσ 1t+1 ∨ · · · ∨Cσnt+1
At ∧ σ 0t ⊃ Cσ 1t+1 ∨C¬σ 1t+1
...
At ∧ σ 0t ⊃ Cσnt+1 ∨C¬σnt+1.
The first of these axioms, in the presence of the subsequent axioms, can be equivalently
replaced (in S5) by
At ∧ σ 0t ⊃ σ 1t+1 ∨ · · · ∨ σnt+1.
We can also equivalently replace each of the subsequent axioms with the following pair.
At ∧ σ 0t ∧ σkt+1 ⊃ Cσkt+1
At ∧ σ 0t ∧¬σkt+1 ⊃ C¬σkt+1.
Notice that these transformations yield formulas in which C occurs at most once, and only
positively. Analogous equivalence transformations apply to the corresponding axioms in
Lin’s theory, given the axioms (51) and (52) guaranteeing that any fluent literal that is
caused is true. These observations show that Lin’s proposal for inclusive nondeterminism
can be applied in the UCL setting, on the basis of Theorem 12. In fact, what we see is
that Lin’s method for inclusive nondeterminism is essentially a variant of the approach
to nondeterminism described briefly in Section 5.3.2. The same observations apply to
Lin’s proposal for exclusive nondeterminism, which, in the UCL setting, is equivalent to
augmenting the inclusive nondeterminism axioms with the additional axiom
At ∧ σ 0t ⊃
∧
16i<j6n
¬(σ it+1 ∧ σjt+1).
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Ultimately, Lin [34] introduces an alternative general method for formalizing nondeter-
minism, using auxiliary Case symbols to distinguish between possible nondeterministic
outcomes. Without going into details, we note that Lin’s “cases” method is easily adapted
to the UCL setting.
Finally, while Theorem 12 embeds Lin’s circumscriptive action theories in UCL, it is
interesting to consider what happens when we proceed in the opposite direction. Let us
assume that a UCL theory T is finite, with a finite signature, and that C is applied only to
literals. In this case, the translation C(T ) is defined. Assume in addition that T includes
the formulas given by the standard schemas (13)–(17), with I consisting of the fluent
names and their negations. If we extend the definition of cat so that it applies even when
Caused is allowed to occur negatively and more than once in each sentence, then it is
straightforward to verify that the circumscriptive theory cat(C(T )) is equivalent to ct(T ).
In light of Theorem 11, this observation shows that if we augment Lin’s action theories
with axioms corresponding to the standard schemas, all models satisfy the principle of
universal causation, and his approach converges with ours.
In establishing these relationships between Lin’s circumscriptive action theories and
UCL action theories, we assume that C is applied only to literals. By doing so, we forfeit
the ability to express directly the fact that a complex formula is caused to hold, and so can
no longer express traditional ramification constraints or introduce defined fluents by the
methods described in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.3.
The results in this section also require that the set of inertial fluents be given by the set
of fluent names and their negations. This assumption is built into Lin’s approach, whereas
in UCL action theories in general, as remarked earlier, the inertial fluents may be chosen
differently. (This facility too is critical to our method for introducing defined fluents.) In
fact, as illustrated in Section 5.3.5, it is possible in UCL to generalize the commonsense
law of inertia so as to allow for fluents that tend to change in particular ways (instead of
tending to stay the same).
10. UCL and autoepistemic logic
It may be interesting to consider the mathematical relationship of UCL to autoepistemic
logic (AEL), which is surely the most widely-familiar modal nonmonotonic logic. For this
purpose we employ the elegant model-theoretic characterization of autoepistemic logic
from [32].
Let T be an autoepistemic theory. We say that a set S of interpretations is an AE model
of T if
S = {I : (I, S) |= T }.
Recall that for autoepistemic logic we do not require that structures (I, S) satisfy the
condition I ∈ S.
The definition of an AE model can be reformulated as follows. A set S of interpretations
is an AE model of an AEL theory T if and only if, for all interpretations I ,
(I, S) |= T iff I ∈ S. (61)
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In this form, we can observe a strong resemblance to the fixpoint condition in UCL, which
can be similarly reformulated, as follows. An interpretation I is causally explained by a
UCL theory T if and only if, for every set S of interpretations such that I ∈ S,
(I, S) |= T iff S = {I }. (62)
Roughly speaking, the reversal of the roles of S and I in the fixpoint conditions (61) and
(62) is reflected in a corresponding reversal of the role of the modal operator in the two
logics. In accordance with this observation, it is not difficult to establish the following. 8
Proposition 15. Let T be a UCL theory consisting of formulas of the form
φ ∨Cψ (63)
where φ and ψ are nonmodal formulas. Take the AEL theory T ′ obtained by replacing
each UCL formula (63) with the AEL formula
Bφ ∨ψ.
An interpretation I is causally explained by T if and only if {I } is an AE model of T ′.
The translation in Proposition 15, while easy to justify directly, can also be obtained in-
directly from Konolige’s well-known partial translation of default logic into autoepistemic
logic [28], via Theorem 4.
We can obtain a more general result of this kind by using a more complex translation, in
which “caused” becomes, roughly speaking, “truly believed”.
Proposition 16. Let T be a UCL theory consisting of formulas of the form
φ ∨Cψ1 ∨ · · · ∨Cψn (64)
where φ,ψ1, . . . ,ψn are nonmodal formulas. Take the AEL theory T ′ obtained by
replacing each UCL formula (64) with the AEL formula
Bφ ∨ (ψ1 ∧ Bψ1)∨ · · · ∨ (ψn ∧ Bψn). (65)
An interpretation I is causally explained by T if and only if {I } is an AE model of T ′.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that I is causally explained by T . So (I, {I }) |= T , and it follows
easily that (I, {I }) |= T ′. Let I ′ be such that (I ′, {I }) |= T ′. So for any formula (65)
in T ′, either I |= φ or both I and I ′ satisfy one of ψ1, . . . ,ψn . It follows that either
(I, {I, I ′}) |= φ or (I, {I, I ′}) satisfies one of Cψ1, . . . ,Cψn . Hence (I, {I, I ′}) |= T , and
since (I, {I }) is the unique I -model of T , I ′ = I . Consequently, {I } is an AE model of T ′.
(⇐) Assume that {I } is an AE model of T ′. So (I, {I }) |= T ′, and it follows easily
that (I, {I }) |= T . Let I ′ be such that (I, {I, I ′}) |= T . So for any formula (64) in T ,
either I |= φ or both I and I ′ satisfy one of ψ1, . . . ,ψn . Therefore either (I ′, {I }) |= Bφ
or (I ′, {I }) satisfies one of ψ1 ∧ Bψ1, . . . ,ψn ∧ Bψn. Hence (I ′, {I }) |= T ′. Since {I } is
8 We will use the symbol B for the AEL modal operator, rather than L, which is also often used.
H. Turner / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 87–123 115
an AE model of T ′, we can conclude that I ′ = I . Consequently, I is causally explained
by T . 2
The natural extension of Proposition 16 to formulas with negative occurrences of C is
not sound. For example, the UCL theory
C(p ∨ q)
Cp ⊃ Cq
Cq ⊃ Cp
has no causally explained interpretations, while {{p,q}} is an AE model of
(p ∨ q)∧ B(p ∨ q)
p ∧ Bp ⊃ q ∧ Bq
q ∧ Bq ⊃ p ∧ Bp.
This approach works though if C is applied only to literals. In fact, the correctness of the
resulting translation can be deduced from an embedding of disjunctive logic programming
under the answer set semantics into autoepistemic logic proposed simultaneously in
[6,32,37], again via Theorem 4.
For our purposes, we can formulate the translation as follows. If C is applied only to
literals in a UCL formula, then the following translation is defined.
A(φ) = Bφ if φ is nonmodal
A(CL) = (L∧ BL) if L is a literal
A(¬φ) = ¬A(φ) if φ is not nonmodal
A((φ ψ)) = (A(φ)A(ψ)) if φ or ψ is not nonmodal.
Here  stands for any of the binary propositional connectives.
Proposition 17. Let T be a UCL theory in which C is applied only to literals. Take the
AEL theory T ′ obtained by replacing each UCL formula φ with the AEL formula A(φ).
An interpretation I is causally explained by T if and only if {I } is an AE model of T ′.
It is unclear what lessons to draw from such mathematical facts. Notice that, for AE
models of the form {I }, the fixpoint condition involves only structures of the form (I ′, {I }).
Therefore, one can, for instance, replace Bφ with ¬B¬φ without affecting the “complete”
AE models. Similarly, one can replace B(φ ∨ψ) with Bφ ∨ Bψ . These observations
demonstrate that the “complete” subset of autoepistemic logic is relatively inexpressive
as a logic of belief, as one would intuitively expect. Nonetheless, Propositions 15–17 show
that interesting causal theories of action can be captured in this subset of AEL.
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11. Nonpropositional UCL
The signature of a (nonpropositional) UCL language is given by a set of nonlogical
constants: that is, function symbols (with arities and sorts) and predicate symbols (with
arities and sorts). (Object constants are functions of arity zero, and propositional constants
are predicates of arity zero.) The definitions of a formula, sentence, theory, free occurrence
of a variable and so on are as expected.
A UCL structure is a pair (I, S) such that S is a set of interpretations with the same
universe, and I ∈ S.
In the recursive truth definition, we extend the language each time a quantifier is
encountered, adding a new nonlogical constant of the appropriate sort. To this end, we
introduce the following auxiliary definition.
Let (I, S) be a UCL structure for a given language. When we add a new nonlogical
constant X to the signature, we call a UCL structure (I ′, S′) for the resulting language
an X-extension of (I, S) if I ′ is an extension of I and S′ is obtained by taking, for each
member of S, the unique extension that interprets X as I ′ does.
The truth of a UCL sentence in a UCL structure is defined by the standard recursions
over the propositional connectives, plus the following four cases. (We assume in the last
two cases that X is a new nonlogical constant of the same sort as the variable x , and by
φ(X) we denote the formula obtained from φ(x) by simultaneously replacing each free
occurrence of x by X.)
(I, S) |= P iff I |= P (for any ground atom P )
(I, S) |= Cφ iff for all I ′ ∈ S, (I ′, S) |= φ
(I, S) |= ∀xφ(x) iff for everyX-extension (I ′, S′), (I ′, S′) |= φ(X)
(I, S) |= ∃xφ(x) iff for some X-extension (I ′, S′), (I ′, S′) |= φ(X).
It is often convenient to designate some nonlogical constants exempt, which, intuitively,
exempts them from the principle of universal causation. Mathematically, this practice is
reflected in the definition of an I -structure: a UCL structure (I, S) such that all members
of S interpret all exempt symbols exactly as I does. An I -model of a UCL theory T is an
I -structure that is a model of T .
The definition of a causally explained interpretation is just as it was in the propositional
case. An interpretation I is causally explained by a UCL theory T if (I, {I }) is the unique
I -model of T .
Clearly, this definition extends the definition introduced in Section 2 for propositional
UCL, assuming that the nonlogical constants of the language (i.e., the propositional
symbols) are not declared exempt.
In fact, the introduction of exempt nonlogical constants, although convenient, is not
mathematically necessary. That is, as in the propositional case, we can effectively exempt
a nonlogical constant from the principle of universal causation by writing appropriate
axioms. If P is a predicate symbol, and x a suitable tuple of variables, we can make P
exogenous, essentially as before, by adding the pair of axioms
∀x(P(x)⊃ CP(x)) (66)
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∀t (0 6= t ′) ∀t, u(t ′ = u′ ⊃ t = u)
∀p(p(0)∧ ∀t (p(t)⊃ p(t ′))⊃ ∀t (p(t))) ∀l(l = L1 6≡ l = L2)
∀l(Up(l,0)⊃ C Up(l,0)) ∀l(¬Up(l,0)⊃ C¬Up(l,0))
IsOpen(0)⊃ C IsOpen(0) ¬ IsOpen(0)⊃ C¬ IsOpen(0)
∀l, t (Up(l, t)∧Up(l, t ′)⊃ C Up(l, t ′)) ∀l, t (¬Up(l, t)∧¬Up(l, t ′)⊃ C¬Up(l, t ′))
∀t (IsOpen(t)∧ IsOpen(t ′)⊃ C IsOpen(t ′)) ∀t (¬ IsOpen(t)∧¬ IsOpen(t ′)⊃ C¬ IsOpen(t ′))
∀l, t (Toggle(l, t)∧Up(l, t)⊃ C¬Up(l, t ′)) ∀l, t (Toggle(l, t)∧¬Up(l, t)⊃ C Up(l, t ′))
∀t (Close(t)⊃ C¬ IsOpen(t ′)) ∀t (∀l(Up(l, t))⊃ C IsOpen(t))
Fig. 1. Lin’s Suitcase domain in second-order UCL.
∀x(¬P(x)⊃ C¬P(x)). (67)
To see this, notice that, for any suitable choice of signature, for any interpretation I , the
I -models of (66)–(67) are exactly the I -structures obtained if P is designated exempt.
That is, any I -structure (I, S) that satisfies (66) and (67) will have the property that every
element of S interprets P exactly as I does, and conversely, (66) and (67) are satisfied
by any I -structure (I, S) in which every element of S interprets P exactly as I does.
A similar approach works for function symbols. If F is a function symbol, x a suitable
tuple of variables and v a suitable variable, then we can make F exogenous by writing
∀x, v(F(x)= v ⊃ CF(x)= v).
As an example of the use of nonpropositional UCL, another version of Lin’s Suitcase
domain is displayed in Fig. 1. The signature of the language and the sorts of variables
should be clear from context. All nonlogical constants except Up and IsOpen are exempt.
In this version of the Suitcase domain, the time structure is axiomatized. (We abbreviate
Successor(t) as t ′.)
12. Nonpropositional causal theories in UCL
Here we review Lifschitz’s definition of nonpropositional causal theories [30], altering
some terminology and notation to maintain greater consistency with the presentation
of (propositional) causal theories in Section 4. We then sketch a proof of the fact that
nonpropositional causal theories are subsumed by (nonpropositional) UCL.
As a consequence, UCL inherits relevant results from nonpropositional causal theories.
For instance, in [31] Lifschitz gives a situation calculus axiomatization of the blocks world
as a first-order causal theory, and relates it to a “Lin-style” formalization, thus providing
another perspective on the use of the situation calculus in UCL. In [19], Giunchiglia and
Lifschitz define a high-level action language C based on nonpropositional causal theories,
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and relate C to the action languageAC of Baral and Gelfond [3]. Giunchiglia and Lifschitz
also include in [19] an interesting general theorem relating C to Lin’s circumscriptive
causal action theories, providing yet another perspective on the situation calculus in causal
theories. (The theorem does not, however, address the question of adequately defining the
Poss predicate, as discussed briefly in Section 7.) Finally, in [30] Lifschitz extends the
literal completion method of [39] to (“definite”) nonpropositional causal theories, thus
showing how, for example, some first-order UCL theories can be translated into first-order
classical logic.
12.1. Lifschitz’s nonpropositional causal theories
Begin with a language of classical logic. As in the previous section, some nonlogical
constants may be designated exempt. In fact, here we must require that only a finite number
of nonlogical constants are not designated exempt. A causal law is an expression of the
form
φ⇒ψ
where φ and ψ are formulas of the language. A causal theory is a finite set of causal
laws. (Notice that, except for the finiteness requirements, this definition of a causal theory
extends that of Section 4.) In Lifschitz’s account, an interpretation is causally explained by
a causal theory just in case it is a model of an associated theory of classical logic, described
next.
In what follows, let N be a list of all nonexempt nonlogical constants. We say that a list
of nonlogical constants or variables is similar to N if it has the same length as N and each
of its members is of the same sort as the corresponding member of N . We can denote a
formula (in which none, some, or all nonexempt nonlogical constants appear) by φ(N).
Then for any listM that is similar to N , we can write φ(M) to denote the formula obtained
by simultaneously replacing each occurrence of each member of N by the corresponding
member of M .
Consider a nonpropositional causal theory D with causal laws
φ1(N,x
1)⇒ψ1(N,x1)
...
φk(N,x
k)⇒ψk(N,xk)
where xi is the list of all free variables for the ith causal law. Let n be a list of new variables
that is similar to N . By D∗(n) we denote the formula∧
16i6k
∀xi(φi(N,xi)⊃ψi(n, xi)).
An interpretation is causally explained by D if it is a model of
∀n(D∗(n)≡ n=N) (68)
where n=N stands for the conjunction of the equalities between members of n and the
corresponding members of N .
H. Turner / Artificial Intelligence 113 (1999) 87–123 119
As shown in [30], this definition of a causally explained interpretation extends
the definition for propositional causal theories reviewed in Section 4. Notice that for
propositional causal theories the corresponding sentence (68) is a quantified boolean
formula, from which quantifiers can be eliminated (with worst case exponential increase
in size). Thus Lifschitz’s definition yields a general translation of propositional causal
theories into classical propositional logic.
12.2. Nonpropositional causal theories in UCL
Here we sketch a proof of the following theorem.
Theorem 18. Let D be a nonpropositional causal theory and let T be the UCL theory
obtained by replacing each causal law φ⇒ψ by the universal closure of the UCL formula
φ ⊃ Cψ . An interpretation is causally explained by D if and only if it is causally explained
by T .
Proof (Sketch) . Let us write ∀nT ∗(n) to denote the sentence (68) whose models are the
interpretations causally explained by D. Extend the language of ∀nT ∗(n) as follows. For
everyX ∈N , add a new nonlogical constantX′ of the same sort. Let N ′ be the list of these
new symbols, which is similar to N . Given an interpretation I of the original language,
an interpretation J of the new language is called an I -interpretation if J extends I . (That
is, if J has the same universe as I and interprets all nonlogical constants in the original
language exactly as I does.) The first observation is that I |= ∀nT ∗(n) iff, for every
I -interpretation J , J |= T ∗(N ′). Let Iˆ be the unique I -interpretation such that for every
X ∈ N , (X′)J =XI . The sentence T ∗(N ′) is an equivalence whose right-hand side is the
sentenceN ′ =N . Since Iˆ is the only I -interpretation that satisfies N ′ =N , it follows from
the previous observation that I |= ∀nT ∗(n) iff Iˆ is the unique I -interpretation satisfying
D∗(N ′).
The proof can be completed by showing that Iˆ is the unique I -interpretation satisfying
D∗(N ′) iff (I, {I }) is the unique I -model of T . The first step is to show that Iˆ |=D∗(N ′)
iff (I, {I }) |= T , by showing that, for any i ,
Iˆ |= ∀xi(φi(N,xi)⊃ψi(N ′, xi))
iff I |= ∀xi(φi(N,xi)⊃ψi(N,xi))
iff (I, {I }) |= ∀xi(φi(N,xi)⊃ Cψi(N,xi)).
All that remains is to prove that if Iˆ |=D∗(N ′), then some I -interpretation other than Iˆ
satisfies D∗(N ′) iff there is a proper superset S of I such that (I, S) |= T .
Now we describe observations and a lemma sufficient to complete this last step.
First, because C occurs only positively in T , we know that if (I, S) |= T , then for any
subset S′ of S such that I ∈ S, (I, S′) |= T . Consequently, one need only consider I -
structures of the form (I, {I, I ′}) in order to determine whether (I, {I }) is the unique
I -model of T . This is convenient because there is a natural one-to-one correspondence
between I -interpretations and I -structures of the form (I, {I, I ′}) such that, for every
I -interpretation J and corresponding I -structure (I, {I, I ′}), for all X ∈N , (X′)J =XI ′ .
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In light of the preceding observations, it remains only to prove the following lemma.
If (I, {I }) |= T , then for any I -interpretation J and corresponding I -structure (I, {I, I ′}),
J |=D∗(N ′) iff (I, {I, I ′}) |= T . For the proof of this lemma, it is convenient to extend the
truth definition for UCL to structures of the form (I, {I ′}), where I ′ may differ from I .
Under this extended truth definition, one can show that, for any i ,
J |= ∀xi(φi(N,xi)⊃ψi(N ′, xi)) iff (I, {I ′}) |= ∀xi(φi(N,xi)⊃ Cψi(N,xi)).
So J |= D∗(N ′) iff (I, {I ′}) |= T . To complete the proof of the lemma, notice that
(I, {I, I ′}) |= T iff both (I, {I }) |= T and (I, {I ′}) |= T , since C appears at most once, and
only positively, in each sentence of T . 2
13. Concluding remarks
This note has introduced UCL, a modal nonmonotonic logic designed for representing
commonsense knowledge about actions. More specifically, in UCL one represents the
conditions under which facts are caused. On the basis of this mathematically simple form
of causal knowledge, UCL characterizes the worlds that are causally possible. The logic
takes its name from the principle of universal causation, the simplifying assumption that
underlies the fixpoint definition of a causally explained interpretation.
In applications of UCL to reasoning about action—discussed primarily in Sections 5,
7, and 9—we have seen that universal causation is easily relaxed by means of standard
axioms. Alternatively, one can declare a subset of the nonlogical constants exempt from
universal causation, as is done in the formalization of the Suitcase domain displayed in
Section 11.
The principle of universal causation plays a key role in the simple, robust solution to
the frame problem employed throughout the paper. We have seen (in Section 5.3.5) that
essentially the same approach can be used to describe inertia in worlds in which, intuitively
speaking, things change (in a certain way) unless they are made not to. It is also interesting
to note that it appears straightforward to generalize this approach in another direction, to
allow for a dense time structure, in which the inertia of a fluent F might be expressed by
writing
∀t(∃r(r < t ∧ ∀s(r 6 s 6 t ⊃ F(s)))⊃ CF(t)).
We have related UCL to Reiter’s default logic (and, more generally, disjunctive default
logic), circumscription, and autoepistemic logic—in Sections 6, 8, and 10. We showed in
Section 4 that UCL extends the causal theories formalism of McCain and Turner, and, in
doing so, provides a more adequate semantic account of it. In Section 12, we showed that
(nonpropositional) UCL extends the nonpropositional causal theories of Lifschitz.
We have shown that UCL inherits a variety of causal theories of action and change
previously proposed in the literature, including in large part the circumscriptive causal
action theories of Lin. We have also established, by means of Theorems 1 and 12, the
remarkable similarity between the causal action theories of Lin and those of McCain and
Turner. In light of this, Theorem 4 and Propositions 15–17 show how such causal action
theories can also be expressed in default logic and in autoepistemic logic.
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It would be interesting to investigate embeddings in UCL of some of the many other
causal approaches to reasoning about action that have been proposed in recent years. Such
results can clarify the relationships between the various proposals. They can also help guide
future work exploring the range of action domains expressible in UCL.
As a final remark, although we have not explored the general problem of computing
causally explained interpretations and UCL entailment, we have noted that a useful subset
of UCL corresponds to logic programming under the answer set semantics, which is
computed by several fast improving, publicly available systems. We have also identified
the class of definite UCL theories, which can be translated into classical propositional
theories of comparable size, by the method of literal completion (Section 4.3). For definite
UCL theories, automated query answering can be carried out simply by using standard
satisfiability tools on the classical propositional theory obtained by literal completion.
This idea is implemented in the system CCALC of Norman McCain, which is currently
available at www.cs.utexas.edu/users/mccain/cc. CCALC can also accept as
input action descriptions in the high-level action language C , mentioned previously.
A theoretical framework for automated planning on the basis of definite UCL theories
is provided by [40], based in part on Kautz and Selman’s notion of satisfiability planning
[26]. The experimental results reported in [40] demonstrate that this approach can yield
relatively good computational performance on classical planning problems.
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